

## **Care and Freedom**

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*October 2000*

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## **Acknowledgments**

I am grateful to the Vanguard Foundation for generously funding my research on globalization, human development, and gender concerns. This paper, part of that ongoing project, would not have been possible but for Professor Arlie Hochschild's keen interest and investment of time, energy, and care. She reversed the global chain of caregivers. I also thank Professors Arlie Hochschild and Barrie Thorne as co-directors of the Center for Working Families, for inviting me to affiliate with the center. Their team, consisting of Bonnie Kwan, Chi-Shan Lin, and Janet Oh, have gone out of their way to provide assistance with loving care. I will always cherish the cordial work atmosphere of the center. I also wish to thank Professors Hochschild and Thorne for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and Dr. Gayle Goodman for allowing me to see her unpublished Ph.D. thesis.

## Abstract

This paper first summarizes the debate between the development enthusiasts and the development skeptics in the fields of human development and development ethics. Development enthusiasts consider development as freedom, but for the skeptics it is a form of coercion. I differentiate two types of freedom: external and internal. Freedom *to* and freedom *from* (the former classified as positive and the latter as negative) both refer to the external domain. The literature on development so far deals only with the external concept of freedom. I classify development theory, based on this concept of freedom, as type I and discuss the limitations of such an approach to development by re-examining the case of the Rajasthani widow much discussed in the development literature. I draw upon experience of the West with this type of development to highlight the problems faced there. I enumerate the ill effects of the pursuit of external freedom in the form of competitive individualism (ignoring the strengths of a self-transcending, care-oriented way of being and raising children), which forms the basis for type I development in order to issue a word of caution before proceeding with this approach in the case of India and other Third World countries. Finally, I present the alternative concept of freedom, viz., the search for inner freedom based on the *advaitic* philosophy in India. Drawing upon the work of culture theorists, I contrast the familial self in India based on this conception of freedom with the individual self of the West. In India the practices of child care have evolved from this concept of freedom and self. Using this notion of freedom, I lay out the framework for type II development, concluding that it will not be possible to work for type II development if we continue with the corporate form of production guided by the profit motive, advertisements, and a wasteful use of resources. Hence the focus of the development debate should shift from culture to the system of production. The East will have to join forces with the movements in the West working for a new work system, as opposed to the “job work” that prevails today.

### **Human Development and Development Ethics – The Debate**

Third World countries – the erstwhile colonies – launched on the path of economic development after they gained independence. They wanted to catch up with their colonial masters in the hope of gaining the level of affluence the latter had attained. The development exercise turned out to be synonymous with modernization, industrialization, urbanization, and an increase in economic growth as measured by the increase in the gross national product.

Soon it was found that a number of people were left out of such a process of development and continued to be poor. Thus the emphasis had to be shifted to eradication of poverty. One started hearing about growth with justice. Since 1990, there has been a further shift from economic growth or economic development to human development. Such a move came in response to the realization that a mere increase in the rate of economic growth won't do; what is required is an improvement in the quality of life of the people. Economic development, which focused merely on an increase in the GNP of a country and its rate of growth, neglected the inequality in the distribution of income and the quality of life. Moreover, it was found that an increase in the GNP does not automatically lead to an improved quality of life.

So long as one was talking of economic growth, it was measurable in terms of the quantum of goods and services. Measurement of quality of life was not such a simple affair. Immediately, a question arose; Isn't quality of life culture specific? Economists could not answer this without help from sociologists, anthropologists, historians, and above all philosophers. Development became an interdisciplinary study. This gave birth to a new field of study, viz., development ethics.

Development theory came to be attacked for giving a “universal concept of human development.” A question arose; Can development ethics avoid presuming that European cultures have universal validity? There were others who came to be accused of treating every distinct culture as sacrosanct and beyond criticism. Several views came to be expressed: (1) Culture does not influence development; it can be ignored. (2) Culture is an obstacle to development. (3) Culture can be used as a policy tool. (4) Local culture is an essential means for development. (5) People have basic cultural needs. (6) The values implied in development are culturally unacceptable (Gasper 1996).

A further push was given to these debates when the World Institute of Development Economic Research (WIDER) took the lead and organized a few conferences, later published in four different volumes. The first and the last volumes (Marglin and Marglin 1990, 1996) consist of essays that are skeptical about the way economic development has been replacing the local systems of knowledge prevalent in the so-called developing countries. However, the other two volumes try to see how the criticisms of the development skeptics can be circumvented and a case for development can still be made. (Sen and Nussbaum 1993; Nussbaum and Glover 1995) This is sometimes called a debate between the universalists and the relativists.

### **The Development Enthusiasts**

By and large the development enthusiasts can be described as universalists in their approach. For this group of thinkers tradition and culture are mostly oppressive. They point to the oppressive traditions of bonded labor, child labor, and the customs that prevent women from taking paid work outside the home. They believe that human development achieved through an improvement of human capabilities and functionings, made possible by provision of education, better medical care, and a rise in incomes, would increase the quality of life of people of the developing countries (Nussbaum and Glover 1995; Sen and Nussbaum 1993).

Based on these discussions, the United Nations Development Program defines human development as the expansion of the range of choices available to people. Since 1990, it has published an annual human development report containing the human development index (HDI) for every country in the world. The three variables the HDI considers are life expectancy at birth, adult literacy, and per capita income. After it was realized that a country may have a high HDI but need not necessarily exhibit greater gender equality, the gender development index (GDI) was measured separately. The GDI takes into consideration the same three variables, but specifically for women, viz., female life expectancy at birth, female literacy, and income of women (in fact it considers the gap between males and females with respect to the three variables).

In the philosophical discussions preceding the construction of these indices, Sen and Nussbaum (1993) point out that these indices should not become tools of cultural imperialism.

At the same time they caution that rejecting cultural imperialism should not lead to the other extreme of cultural relativism. The question raised is whether we should look at local traditions or seek a more universal account of human beings assessing the various local traditions against it. Taking either route is beset with serious problems, but Sen and Nussbaum still vote for a universal account of the good human being, fully aware of the epistemological difficulty, viz., where do these norms come from? And why are they considered better? Such a course seems to be very paternalistic, and policies based on the HDIs in Third World countries are more so, considering the fact that they were not participants in these philosophical discussions. Another limitation of these discussions pertains to their focus on the standard of living to the utter neglect of style of living.

In the context of women in the Third World countries the second volume discusses a particular case of a Rajasthani woman in India who is a widow and whose culture does not permit her to take a paid job outside her home. But for her survival and for the sake of her two minor children she needs one urgently. Posed in this way the answer would definitely be that she should break her custom and tradition and take a job. But this leaves certain questions unanswered, viz., why the community that has such a custom did not provide for her and her children when her husband died. Moreover, would the market be able to guarantee her a job? If it does not, who would come to her rescue?

The development enthusiasts draw heavily from the enlightenment thinkers (who were also universalists), whose mission was to redeem people from the burden of tradition. As one author puts it:

Traditions, they felt, had entrenched corrupt and oppressive authority structures in church and state, and the need to genuflect to tradition had been the main obstacle, over the centuries, to international peace and the pursuit of economic, medical and social progress.... in place of tradition, the Enlightenment hoped to establish a "science of morals" that would allow individuals to determine goals for and methods of action open to the kind of rational, free, and peaceful discussion characteristic of natural science.... one result of this attitude was the attempt to produce an account of morality freed as much from the unexamined notions and rituals passed down in families and small communities as modern medicine is from folk remedies and magic. (Fleischacker 1994:22-23)

The same author points out the moral flaws of Enlightenment ideals, one of which is its neutral standard for knowledge. Against this the relativists hold that we all have some emotions and moral commitments that color everything we believe. Therefore they point out that “the Enlightenment project of beginning from an objective, neutral, universal ground was incoherent and indeed itself biased” (Fleishchacker 1994; Macintyre 1984).

### **The Development Skeptics**

The development skeptics raise this question: To have economic growth, must we buy a whole package that changes the society, polity, and the culture along with the economy? According to them, development and modernization have meant

on the economic side, industrialization and urbanization, as well as the technological transformation of agriculture; on the political side, rationalization of authority and the growth of a rationalizing bureaucracy; on the social side, the weakening of ascriptive ties and the rise of achievement as the basis of personal advancement; culturally, the “disenchantment” of the world...the growth of science and secularization based on increasing literacy and numeracy.” (Marglin and Marglin 1990:2)

The skeptics further attempt to tackle the enthusiasts’ position that development expands choices as follows:

Even if we define development and modernization as processes, should we accept without question the assumption that these processes – industrialization, technical transformation of agriculture, political rationalization, meritocracy, secularization, and the spread of scientific outlook – are simply means towards other ends? Would it not make as much or more sense to focus on the expansion of choice and to see these processes as among new possibilities opened up as choices expand? From this vantage point, we would judge modernization and development as outcomes of, rather than as preconditions for, growth. The case would be that development and modernization reflect an expansion of possibilities. (Marglin and Marglin 1990:4)

Expansion of choices does not seem to be controversial, but it is not that simple. In the first place one must assume that growth does expand choices in all relevant dimensions. Second, one must distinguish between the intrinsic and the instrumental reasons that make growth

desirable. It is intrinsically desirable if it is valued for its own sake irrespective of the choice actually made; it is instrumentally desirable when it enables a person to attain a preferred position hitherto beyond her reach. If the modern precludes the possibility of choosing the traditional, then it cannot be considered that the choices have expanded. Hence the intrinsic reason for its desirability cannot be maintained. The instrumental reason of its desirability also fails if the new set of choices does not include the old state. If the individual can choose between the modern and the tradition at will, then one can maintain that the choices have expanded. The problem is that development is not a reversible process, that is, once you have voted for development, if you find it restricting your choice, you cannot revert to the old state. Various studies have borne this out (Marglin and Marglin 1990, 1996). To give meaning to life, development has increasingly focused on commodities consumed. In this type of development workers have no control over the work process, as opposed to their counterparts in some non-Western societies, where transcendental meaning is found in day-to-day activities. One example to the craft workers in an Indian village (Marglin and Marglin 1990).

### **Development – Freedom or Coercion?**

The latest *avatar* (incarnation) of development is as freedom. Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen (1999) is now talking of development as freedom. Instead of the utilitarian approach of according primacy to the multiplication of goods or to the libertarian ideal of liberty (Nozick 1974) or the Rawlsian emphasis on justice (Rawls 1971), Sen makes a plea for focusing on economic and political freedom to ensure the development of human capabilities. According to Sen, development as freedom would enable human capabilities to flower. The value of freedom has become so unquestioned and sacrosanct that, when one wants to end a debate on a policy, one's last resort is that this or that stratagem promotes freedom (Bergmann 1977). In the same way, as the development skeptics questioned the very concept of development, Sen argues that the greatest virtue of development is that it promotes freedom without waiting to open the Pandora's box attached to it.

Let us take Sen's argument that the market eliminates the erstwhile bonded labor, removes child labor, and enables women to become economically independent by taking paid jobs. But does the transformation of the peasants' status into free laborers actually expand their choice sets? According to Marglin, the answer is yes and no.

The new status allows people to pursue non-traditional occupations, and to sell their labor power for whatever price the traffic will bear. But with freedom of contract comes a new vulnerability to market forces. Suppose drought, excessive rain, or some other calamity, natural or man-made occurs, and the harvest fails. The free but landless peasant suffers not only from a diminished harvest, but also from diminished demand for his labor power, whereas the unfree peasant may have access to a more substantial portion of the harvest on the basis of traditional rights. (Marglin and Marglin 1990:6)

In fact, one wonders whether Sen has deliberately chosen the title *Development as Freedom* in response to Marglin and other development skeptics' descriptions of development as coercion (Marglin and Marglin 1990). Stephen Marglin argues that in the transformation of work in its modern Western form from household to the factory there was a deliberate attempt to take control of the product and the process from the worker. This is why the factory system is abhorred in some of the Third World countries where it is newly introduced. In the same volume in another paper Frederique Apffel Marglin shows how the British imposed smallpox vaccination on the Indians and denied the natives the freedom to continue with the traditional practice of "variolation." Similarly, Appadurai concludes, after an examination of the effects of commercialization of agriculture in a village in western India, that coercion comes in subtler ways. For example, with commercialization comes a more individualistic attitude that undermines social cohesion in numerous ways. Before the onset of commercialization several cultivators shared a well, and "sharing of risks associated with the water – supply was part and parcel of the social cohesion of the village." Ashish Nandy and Shiv Visvanathan's study shows "that the introduction of Western medicine marginalized traditional forms of medicine and effectively deprived Indians of the choices available within these more pluralistic systems of medical knowledge" (Marglin and Marglin 1990:17-20).

These scholars show that freedom is a cultural construction. They point to the cultural biases that underlie both the instrumental and intrinsic reasons for expansion of choice:

The intrinsic valuation of freedom of choice would appear to be more resilient to criticism, for a great deal of cross-cultural agreement surely exists on the undesirability of oppression. However, oppression is defined so variously that this agreement can hardly be equated to a common desire for freedom in the sense this term has in the West, where individual autonomy is privileged as the core meaning of freedom, and constraints on autonomy become the central meaning of oppression. This disposition to universalize a peculiarly Western interpretation does very little for cross-cultural dialogue and even less for mutual understanding. Indeed, in large parts of the world, the Western notion of freedom sounds suspiciously like license, and the difficulties of distinguishing between the freedom to do one's own "thing" and the freedom to become one's own person do not make it any easier to dispel these doubts. (Marglin and Marglin 1990:11)

They also find that freedom as autonomy is closely related to freedom as control, which is equally culturally bound. Economic growth was conventionally portrayed as enabling people to have greater control over their environment, but Marglin rightly points out that "outside the West, adaptation may commend itself as a better basis of freedom than control, a basis that might indeed spare the environment the despoliation that has been associated with development" (Marglin and Marglin, 11). Instead, in India, particularly the Gandhian movement has stressed control over self as opposed to controlling the environment. Marglin's major argument is about the need for different "systems of knowledge," and according to him the imposition of one system of knowledge on the other is coercion and not freedom.

In the context of globalization it seems increasingly now that the option of staying outside the paradigm of development is not available to the developing countries. The development skeptics are conscious of this, and they are also pleading for opening a dialogue between the two systems of knowledge instead of one dominating the other. This dialogue can begin by examining the notion of freedom and self in the two systems and its consequences for the provisioning of care in societies based on them. The question is therefore to see how the adverse effects of modernization and development can be minimized because they cannot be wished away. They have made inroads even in the remote villages of the developing countries.

## Development as Freedom- Type I

### Positive and Negative Freedom

The approach to type I development is beset with serious problems, as pointed out by the development skeptics. But before considering the alternative to it, we need to examine further the nature of freedom implied in this discourse of development. So I return to the case of the Rajasthani widow, Metha Bai, described by Martha Chen (1995). Metha Bai was prevented by custom and tradition from taking paid employment outside her house, but to survive and feed her two minor children she desperately needed a job. Thus according to this approach to development, she needs to be freed *from* the so-called oppressive custom and tradition *to* take a paid job or *to* enter the market. Overtly, she is gaining freedom, but she is not really choosing – this choice is thrust on her. She is forced to take a job because there is no other way out. Why has she been driven to this position? To understand that, we need to look into the historical forces that have deprived her of resources like access to land and to other common property (in this case she has a small piece of land and gets gifts from her ailing old father). She cannot, for example, resort to livestock farming or growing her food or collecting fuel free from the nearby woods. Thus it is not merely the customs and traditions that are oppressing her. Colonialism, imperialism, and the individual ownership of land and other assets have done their share in depriving her of her means of livelihood. If we do not recognize these forces, her taking a paid job is not really going to free her. She would be thrown out of the frying pan into the fire – freed *from* the clutches of tradition only *to* be enslaved by the market. Can such a development be seen as freedom?

Metha Bai at best gains freedom in the negative sense, viz., freedom *from* obstruction by others. Suppose that one of her two children is very small and needs to be taken care of by someone when she goes out to work. If she resents the interference by her in-laws, her own siblings, or parents, then either her older child (particularly if a female) would do the baby-sitting for the younger one, in which case the evil of child labor would be reinforced, or some other provision for child care would have to be worked out. The possibility of the latter would depend on the type of job she takes. Considering the fact that she is not likely to be literate, she would in

all probability take an unskilled job (e.g., as a construction worker, a menial servant, or a low-paid worker in some other informal sector activity). She might even be forced to migrate to a town or some other country where she might earn more money but with an insecure job with no social security for old age or illness. In all these cases again the question of what happens to the children when she takes a job is still unanswered. If she loses the sympathy of her kin and the community, taking care of the children is not going to be easy. Resorting to paid care would be next to impossible, considering her low level of income. She would be therefore forced to get support from someone either in the family or in the community. In India, if she is disowned by her caste group for taking paid work outside her house, she is likely to get the support from members of a caste lower than her own. It would be pertinent to inquire into the nature of the relationship between her and the lower caste woman who supports her. If her social status falls, even if she earns more money and is economically well off, psychologically, how does she compensate for the loss of social status?

By becoming *free from* the tyranny of the kin and community she does not automatically gain freedom in the positive sense of being *free to* do the job she wants to do. She would be forced to do the job she is able to get. There may still be days and months when she is unemployed. Thus she is not free in the positive sense either because freedom in the positive sense “derives from the wish of the individual to be his own master – the wish to be self-directed and not to be directed by others” (Berlin 1969:131). Metha Bai is not her own master in the job she does. If she becomes a nanny in the city or in some developed country, would she gain freedom in the positive sense?

Is the lot of middle-class, educated women who are being allowed to take paid work outside the home any better? Educated men in India have a preference for working women (irrespective of the custom and tradition). But their working wives now have to manage “two shifts” like their counterparts in the West (Hochschild 1989). They are oppressed not only by custom and tradition (patriarchy), but now also by the market. If earlier the so-called lack of freedom stood in the way of the development of their capabilities, now it is the “second shift” that prevents them from it. Have they gained freedom through this kind of a development of

being able to take paid work? Hence merely by breaking custom and tradition and taking paid work outside the home, Metha Bai is not going to gain freedom.

“Slavery is not equivalent to the absence of freedom. The two concepts do not stand as polar opposites, and slavery does not represent the end point on a continuum of decreasing liberties” (Bergmann 1977:8). A monk has less freedom, but he is not a slave. As Bergmann (1977:8) says,

[I]t is only the deprivation of other things, less equivocal and more debilitating than the diminishment of freedom, that reduces a man to that condition.... [T]he other side of it is...if taking someone’s freedom does not make him a slave, then merely giving him his freedom back is also not sufficient to terminate that degradation. Setting him free may in fact be the easiest and smallest part of what is to be done to restore a man from that position.

If history is any proof, we must realize that, although the idea of freedom originated in slavery and the slaves yearned for freedom, what they got (through the abolition of slavery) was only citizenship and not freedom. In Hesoid’s Greece the same forces that “were paving the way for male discovery and appropriation of freedom as a value were also laying the groundwork for the nearly complete subjection of women” because civic freedom in the Athenian democracy was “exclusively” a “male club” (Patterson 1991:77). Similarly, would Metha Bai, who is supposed to gain freedom in the negative sense by taking paid work, be able to become a true citizen? Or would she end up being a second-rate citizen? In the market will she get pay equal to that of her male counterpart? Or will she be subjected to discrimination in the labor market on the basis of gender? Even if she gets personal freedom, is there any guarantee that she will also get civic freedom?

Slaves were engaged in doing care work. When they were freed their services came to be commanded by the elite through the market. Rosa Luxemburg pointed out that capitalism always needs a noncapitalist sector to exploit. This probably is especially so in the case of caregiving. Capitalism keeps up the productivity and efficiency of its workers on the basis of low-priced or free care at home. The housewife who was until recently in the noncapitalist sector provided the

cushion. When women went out increasingly for paid work, nannies had to be imported from the noncapitalist parts of the world.

Development as freedom should not turn out to be a slogan to relocate labor in the world. The conclusions of a study quoted by Hochschild (2000) is startling because it shows that it is a greater dose of development and not underdevelopment or less development in the Phillipines that is driving more women to come as nannies to the United States. The argument of the development enthusiasts for freeing labor from custom and tradition seems similar to that put forward by the colonial rulers in favor of abolition of slavery. What seemed to be a very humanitarian policy turned out to be motivated by their need to obtain labor to run plantations and perform similar activities (Uma Devi 1989). The Rajasthani widow should not be freed from the oppressive custom and tradition only to be made available as a nanny in the developed countries.

In the context of globalization would development as freedom in the Third World countries really free the bonded labor and women, or would it merely change their masters? In the name of freedom and development they may end up doing the same jobs or less skilled jobs for people in the developed part of the world, rather than their own. They may seem to be choosing to do so, but actually the choice may be thrust on them.

Further, the nature of self, implied in this discourse of development as freedom, is the Western competitive individualist self. It is a self pursuing only individual rights and individual autonomy. Doubts are already being raised about such an individual, who is found incapable of sustaining either a public or a private life (Bellah et al. 1985). Such an individualism is creating a way of life that is neither socially nor individually viable.

Both notions of freedom in this discourse of development, viz., in the negative and positive sense (freedom *from* and freedom *to*), look at only the outer freedom and not the inner freedom. Pursuit of this outer freedom in the West has led to the creation of the *empty self*. Being characterized by a pervasive sense of personal emptiness, it has got committed to the values of self-liberation through consumption. Such a self, as Cushman (1995:6) says, “is a perfect complement to the economy that wards off stagnation by arranging for the continual purchase and consumption of surplus goods.” This self has only one identity and that is through the work

the individual does. If one is not engaged in paid work, one has no identity. Contrast the Rajasthani widow's situation. When custom and tradition still have a hold over the individual in a society, as in the case of Metha Bai, there is a loss of social identity by taking paid work outside the house. However, any new identity she acquires in the market through her job would be totally dependent on her work status. If she is unemployed, she has no identity.

Poor Metha Bai does not know that as soon as she steps out of her house to take employment, she is joining the "job system" that came into being only with the Industrial Revolution and that she (1) will have to suffer the humiliation of working for someone else, (2) is likely to be hired and fired, and (3) may start feeling a rage about the demeaning work (Bergmann 1977). These are the consequences of having to sell her labor power – the worst aspect of capitalism. As a result she is likely to lose not only her caste or ethnic identity, but she will also be alienated from her own emotions and body. Should she become an air hostess, she would be robbed of even her smile because she would be taught to smile at the passengers whether she wants to or not. In this way she would be alienated from her own emotions (Hochschild 1983).

Paid employment may give Metha Bai external freedom, but it also leads to her alienation. How can we ensure that in the process of taking paid work she is not alienated? The development enthusiasts suggest that this identity be replaced by her identity as a citizen with rights. That is, she is enrolled as a member of the civil society, which is based on the recognition of human rights. But in this discourse of rights, the powerful would always be able to assert their rights over those of the weak. Therefore in a society where inequality prevails the weak would never get true justice. Moreover, the language of rights is alien to Metha Bai. For example, every woman in India has the right to divorce, but because of the social taboo, their cultural upbringing, and emotional makeup, not many women would exercise this right, not even women who have chosen their partners or who are from a different community or caste. Once they are married, they conform more jealously to the tradition to gain acceptance and recognition in the extended family and society.

There are other obstacles to the emergence of the civil society. To assume that the freedom in the negative sense that paid work provides would enable Metha Bai to bring about a change in

the society is unrealistic. Because the question is change in which direction. Would she start saving to give a huge dowry for her daughter? If she educates her son, what would she expect from him? Would she expect him to bring a bride with a dowry? The problem is that when custom and tradition and market join hands, those who flout custom and tradition to serve the market end up using the market to reinforce patriarchy. Market tends to use custom and tradition for its own ends and in this process tends to reinforce the evils of the latter.

Metha Bai should know that if she works hard and spends on her son's education, there is no guarantee that he is going to look after her in her old age. She may break custom and tradition for his sake, but the contradiction is that she may still expect her son to follow custom and tradition, to look after her in her old age. Similarly, many do not understand the Roman law imposed by the colonialists in India. The legal process is also very costly and delayed. So the change toward the creation of civil society expected by the development enthusiasts is far fetched.

Everyone in India, while modernizing, thinks he or she will be able to get modernization's best features (e.g., increased income), but avoid the changes (both good and bad) associated with it. The man whose wife earns outside the home thinks she will bring the pay packet home with no other changes in her attitude toward housework, extended family, and so forth. Or he expects she will put the family's interests above her professional commitments. Thus the powerful (in this case the husband) expect to get the best of both worlds, viz., best of the market and of the tradition, which gives them certain privileges on the basis of their caste or gender. The weak end up getting the worst of both.

However, even if the weak come to understand their rights by being educated by a trade union or a woman's group, there is the possibility of their seeking rights in an irresponsible manner, to shirk work. There is equally the danger that the leaders may use them for their selfish ends. These are some of the experiences of India and some other developing countries with development as freedom – type I. Before jumping into development as freedom – type I, Third World countries and the development enthusiasts would do well to look into the West's experience with it.

## **Western Experience of Development as Freedom – Type I**

Sociologists, psychotherapists, economists, and feminists are expressing their concerns about the consequences faced by Western society in the pursuit of external freedom to the utter neglect of one's inner being. Western society is facing an impasse – how to combine the pursuit of individual freedom with the preservation of a communal life. What should be the nature of the family? How can care be provided without jeopardizing the freedom gained by women? How can people have plenty and yet not be trapped by consumerism and overwork?

In fact pursuit of individual freedom is found to be the biggest culprit, being, “an organic part of the culture that developed such capacities and such needs for expansion that it destroyed all other civilizations – some by annihilation, the rest by making them Western.... it is not innocent, it lent a hand when the West made lepers of two-thirds of mankind” (Bergmann 1977:11).

In the search for alternatives to competitive individualism in the West not only is there a rethinking on the family, but also on authority, faith, and tradition. Another recurring theme is that an unencumbered self is empty. The unencumbered self – unencumbered from home and the church – the requirement for success in the impersonal world of competition, is the opposite of what is required to build a community. As Bellah, (forthcoming) says, “communities are constituted by their past – stories of collective history and exemplary individuals are an important part of the tradition that is so central to a community of memory.” He argues for a transformation of the social ecology. If the civil rights movements have failed in America, according to him, it is because there was no transformation in the social ecology – no change in the relationship between the government and the economy and no establishment of economic democracy.

Many American social thinkers are realizing that the marketization of noneconomic functions is leading to greater pressures on the individual self. Freedom is turning out to be a mechanism of coercion. Freedom based on disembodied reason alone has led to the depletion of all institutions that formerly protected the life world. Thus some suggest that the way of life has to be transformed to restore the organic relationship between human beings and the biosphere (Bellah 1999). If individuality is extolled and each person rings himself by a fence of rights, then

he also faces isolation. As Bergmann (1977:10) says, “alienation may be a completely inevitable by-product of ‘freedom’ and discussions of the modern ‘loss of community’ will be mawkish as long as they do not acknowledge that individuality and community do tend to exclude each other, that the space occupied by one will be taken from the other.”

How does this form of individualism impact on care? With individual fulfillment ranking higher than ever before, family as an institution has suffered the most. The nuclear family, which provided space for “emotional intimacy of the heterosexual couple, their sexual life, and socialization of the children” is unable to keep itself intact (forthcoming). The very concept of the Standard North American Family (SNAF) is being questioned. But alternative arrangements for care of children have not been worked out. Recourse to paid care is beset with new sets of problems, particularly if the caregiver is recruited from certain ethnic groups or from the Third World (developed countries passing on care work to women from the developing countries). “It is factually wrong and morally insensitive to blame these changes in the family on ‘women’s liberation’ – returning women to a situation where they lack legal rights – so as to ‘save the family’ would be not only repugnant to women but wholly incompatible with the current understanding of the dignity befitting any human being” (Bellah 1991:46).

Although no one is able to say that the modern nuclear family is the only possibility, when it comes to raising the children, most people are trying to understand the changes in the society that are making such a family unattainable and whether this trend can be altered. The family is under pressure from the state as well as the economy (Bellah 1984).

There is a lot of rethinking going on about “family” among the sociologists as well as the feminist scholars in the West. One such attempt is by Barrie Thorne (1982), a sociologist and feminist, showing that feminist positions on family that devalue its importance have been easily co-opted to serve the interests of the state. Another feminist scholar voices her concern by pointing out the difference between “a theory of individuality that recognizes the importance of the individual within the social collectivity” and “the ideology of individualism that assumes a competitive view of the individual.” According to this scholar, feminist theory of liberation must take account of this difference and not fall a prey to the latter view (Eisenstein 198:5). Bell

Hooks, a feminist who is very critical of the feminist theory emanating from “privileged women at the center” argues

“[T]he ideology of “competitive, atomistic liberal individualism” has permeated feminist thought to such an extent that it undermines the potential radicalism of feminist struggle. Feminist activists need to affirm the importance of family as a kinship structure that can sustain and nourish people; to graphically address links between sexist oppression and family disintegration, and to give example, both actual and visionary, of the way family life is and can be when unjust authoritarian rule is replaced with an ethic of communalism, shared responsibility, and mutuality. The movement to end sexist oppression is the only social change movement that will strengthen and sustain family life in households. (Hooks 1984:8)

The problem is that family of every type has been the location of power and oppression as well as of love, care, and nurture. The challenge is to see how this institution can cater to the latter without becoming a tool of oppression. Pursuit of competitive individualism is not the answer because the ultimate aim of ending power and oppression is to move toward an ethic of love and caring.

Development as freedom – type I, with its emphasis on competitive individualism, has led to an extreme form of consumerism, greed, and materialism. As a result there is in some parts of the United States a growing dissatisfaction with “the work-and-spend culture.” A study by Juliet Schor (1999) shows that nearly one-fifth of all adult Americans have made a voluntary lifestyle change by “downshifting.” Another 12 percent was involuntarily downshifted by losing a job or getting a pay cut. People have started looking for happiness “inside” and have been adopting a simple way of life. This clearly shows that development linked to individualism and freedom should not necessarily be equated with progress. There are more collective, self-transcending, care-oriented human “outcomes” (ways of being, ways of raising children) that have strengths but are getting undermined by economic development – type I.

When such is the experience of the West with development as freedom – type I, how can the development enthusiasts prescribe this path for developing countries like India? Such an approach to development would be and is a more painful process in the context of India, where, even today, the remnants of a society based on the pursuit of inner freedom are still to be found.

In fact the *advaitic* (non-dualistic) notion of inner freedom may have something to offer even the West, where alternatives to competitive individualism are being worked out.

### **Development as Freedom – Type II (the Indian Perspective)**

#### **Development and Inner Freedom**

In the *advaitic* tradition of Hinduism true freedom is internal and not purely external. Unlike the Western individualist self, the self in this system of philosophy, called the *atman*, is the cosmic consciousness. It is pure intelligence and is identical to the ultimate metaphysical reality called the *brahman*. The *atman* is different from the intellect because the *atman* or self is that which illumines but the intellect is that which is illumined. The *atman* is changeless and eternal and alone exists. The world of appearances is maintained by each name and form and therefore limited. *Brahman* is infinite and unlimited. By identifying the self falsely with the name and form or with matter, life, and mind, we limit it and get bound or are in bondage. Liberation or freedom is realization of the falsity of the identification of the self with matter, life, and mind. Freedom is thus an inner experience, and the obstacles to it are not external, but internal (Satprakashananda 1965). Restriction of freedom is internal when a higher impulsion with which our self has identified is resisted or overpowered by a lower impulsion with which our self-identification is still strong. For example, I am committed to the cause of women's liberation, but in the course of my realization of that aim I get name, fame, and money. I might at some stage find that, instead of realization of my aim, I am seized with greed for more name and fame. If the latter stands in the way of my realizing the goal, then within me a battle takes place between my aim and greed. If I succumb to the latter I am a slave to the lower, the more impetuous, and the more violent. Achieving a free, unhindered play of the higher affords a hearty experience of freedom. Thus freedom is to be achieved and enjoyed through an inner process of growth. This process is called yoga or union with the highest. Such a self or individual is a particular representation of the universal. In fact the individual, the universal, and the transcendent give the full meaning of existence. In the light of this an exponent of Indian philosophy says that

[D]emocracy recognized the truth of the individual. But the individual it recognized and sanctified was the competitive individual – but the universal in the individual as a part of its individuality it failed to see. Socialism recognized the universal in the individual but made it the whole stuff even of the individuality – the transcendent was not recognized by either. And without it freedom loses its reference to the reality of the evolutionary process and its dynamic goals of the future. (Sen 1959:65)

In this conception of self, individual liberation is essentially bound up with social liberation. An emancipated individual must extend his liberation horizontally and thus free his cosmic consciousness, too, then advance vertically so as to achieve the higher integration of the future evolution for the perfection of his own life and that of the society. On the realistic side it has a complete appreciation of the physical, vital, and mental in personality and society. In relation to freedom it admits of stages of growth and even the necessity of coercion in the progressive unfolding of freedom. That is why Indian thought is characterized as context sensitive, as opposed to the context-free modes (Ramanujam 1989). Among the stages are the total helplessness of the child, when complete goodwilled guidance and aid are necessary. (See how care is built into freedom.) Then comes that of the rise and play of the ego, which demands recognition of the will for self-assertion and independence. But the egoism of the ego tends to widen and moderate itself, and thus its competitiveness develops cooperativeness. The cooperativeness becomes a full reality at a further stage in the growth of the selfhood, where the individual spontaneously feels as one with the society and the rest of existence. This is when the ego becomes the soul. Each one of these stages has its own operations of freedom. Freedom acquires its full meaning only at the last stage, when the individual is able to live out of a self-existent soul. If freedom is growth to such a status of self-existence, then relative coercion to check the lower rebellious impulses with a view to later bringing them to guide themselves rightly would be quite justifiable. But this only can be done in a disinterested way under goodwill (Sen 1959). Thus freedom is neither *from* nor *to* but true freedom can be only with love. It is freedom through inner renunciation (Marcaurelle 2000).

Thus Indian thought interprets human relations in terms of the debt individuals owe one another. This conception postulates a social structure and relationship in terms of human

obligation as prior to human rights and as arising out of them. The idea of community expresses the basic truth of human relations. Community is a more inclusive conception than the state. The consciousness of freedom therefore unites the right means with the right ends in action (Nikam 1959).

### **Self in the East and West**

Culture theorists like Geertz (1975), Johnson (1985), Roland (1988), and several others have recognized the differences in the construction of the self in the West and East. These differences are pertinent to an understanding of the notion of freedom and its implications for care of the children, the old, and the sick. Development as freedom – type II, unlike type I does not ignore these.

According to Geertz (1975:48), “Westerners see themselves as individuals who are ‘bounded unique’ with a more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe...organized into a distinctive whole set contrastively both against other such wholes and against a social and natural background.” Indians see themselves as parts of a whole, hierarchically determined, collective social order, inseparable from their social context and their relationships. They are interdependent rather than independent, and much of their motivation and cognition arises in the context of their relationships and obligations (Dumont 1980).

If self is comprised of both self and object, with self as subject being the internal states and self as object being the externally related self, Westerners see self and object as divided, but Easterners see themselves as unitary beings, simultaneously subject and object (Johnson 1985). The implications are that Easterners tend to identify with phenomena (Shearer 1993), and Westerners tend to see divisions between themselves and phenomena.

Roland’s (1988) concept of contrasting characteristics of Eastern, predominantly familial self and Western, predominantly individual self is summarized in Table 1.

**Table 1. Aspects of Familial and Individualized Self** (Goodman 1996:77)

<u>Familial Self</u>	<u>Individualized Self</u>
symbiosis – reciprocity (we-self)	individualistic (I-self)
narcissistic configurations of we-self regard	narcissistic structures of self-regard
social contextual ego ideal	ego ideal of individualism
super-ego oriented to extended family needs	super-ego differentiated and oriented towards abstract principles
communication – verbal and non-verbal	communication – focused on verbal
contextual cognitive and ego-functioning	cognitive and ego functioning oriented to rationalism, self- reflection

According to Roland the inner representations of self are different for the Indians and the Westerners. The latter have a strong differentiation of self-other, but for the former the self-other images are “interconnected and suffused with affect” (Roland 1988:225). Goodman (1996:72), quoting Roland, contrasts the monistic imagery of inner “we” or relational “I” with the Western dualistic I-you imagery:

Indian we-self images are multifaceted and organized hierarchically in the context of the extended family, the group and the *jati*...westerners tend to strive for the development of strong ego boundaries in order to form relationships, which are characterized by separation, privacy and autonomy. In contrast, permeable ego boundaries are suitable for relationships in the more symbiotic mode, characterized by “giving and asking, of caring for and depending on, of influencing and being influenced, of close, warm, emotional connectedness and interdependence. The centrality of relationships completely transcends any other considerations of separate or individualized self” (Roland 1988:226).

In India individuation is not relevant in the social realm. According to Goodman (1996:72), it is manifest in the inner life of the private self,

where, fantasy or spiritual life are activated in retreat from the world...the individual self of the inner life is subordinated to and kept in check by the familial self...fulfillment of personal wishes is renounced in deference to the needs of others and the group. On the spiritual level, individuation increases later in life after social obligations of the householder stage have been fulfilled.

Further, “the permeability of the boundaries of the Hindu self,” as pointed out by Goodman (1996:72), heightens the influence of interpersonal interactions on the “transactional self.” For example, the concept of *samskara*, which refers to the imprint of actions and experiences that effect the inner transformation, is the result of influence and interactions with others upon the self. Contact with gross substance is to be avoided. A transformation of the self from the gross to the subtle and the divine state of the *atman* leads to the ultimate goal of liberation or *moksha*. Thus culturally, human development for the Indians is not merely literacy and an increase in life expectancy and income but the transformation of the self from the gross to the subtle. Prime place is accorded spirituality (not to be equated with religion and mere rituals) or the inner contemplative side of life, which in development – type I is belittled, derided, and understood as underdevelopment.

In a developing country like India neither the market nor the state is in a position to provide care. However the philosophy of self and freedom in India is an asset for development – type II, which is care friendly. In fact in India childcare practices are based on the goal of inner freedom. Children are brought up to understand interdependence and are not encouraged to work for individual freedom in the social realm. Some of these practices are very similar to ones being worked out by some thinkers in the West, who are disenchanted with the extreme competitive individualism in their society promoted by education and other child-rearing practices.

### **The Self and Child Care Practices in India**

Based on an understanding of the self in Hindu philosophy, Goodman presents the findings of her field data collected through observation and interviews conducted in Mysore (India). She shows how each of the ceremonies performed during the first year after a baby’s birth, like the first visit to the temple, the cradle ceremony, the naming ceremony, and the first year ceremony, lead to the formation of the familial self in India. For example,

[T]he first time the Hindu baby leaves the house after birth is to go to the temple...offerings are given and the baby is prostrated before the god. This act of prostration serves to inculcate humility and teach a gesture of self-abnegation and deference to others in a more exalted position starting in the first days of life and continuing lifelong. Learning this attitude starts with a physical act of molding the baby's body and in time becomes a stance carried intrapsychically. (Goodman 1996: 93)

Similarly, Goodman highlights the fact that a child has no name until the naming ceremony takes place. This, according to her, is an interesting comment on the nonindividuality of the infant....

[I]t is important to note that it is religious authority that confers the status of personhood that a name grants. This is in keeping with Hindu ideas of self and *karma* wherein spiritual forces determine destiny and rebirth. Powers of agency or initiative lie in *karmic* forces and the collective group rather than the individual. Similarly, the religious or astronomical names are given before the individual name.... The religious precepts...have profound consequences for the formation of the collective self. Messages about collective values emphasizing the predominance of the group over the individual and encouraging a sense of interrelatedness and interdependence permeate physical acts of caretaking from the first days of life. Collectivist beliefs permeate acts of socialization and affect the process of self-other differentiation. (Goodman 1996: 99)

Goodman (1996:99-101) lists the following beliefs and acts:

1. From an early age in basic acts of daily life the child is shown that nothing can be accomplished alone. For example, more than one woman is required for bathing the baby. More than one person feeds the baby. Only the breast-feeding is left totally to the mother.
2. Women caregivers are largely interchangeable in their child-rearing functions. Female relatives contribute as a team to provide such basic care as feeding, bathing, and holding the infant. This interchangeability tends to de-emphasize individual importance. Not even the primary emotional ties with the mother are allowed to interfere with the smooth functioning of the joint family as a unit. Following Kurtz (1992), Goodman (1996:100) argues that, "the whole object of

socialization in India is to encourage the child to renounce infantile pleasures and special ties with the mother in order to be accepted into full membership in the larger family group.”

3. Caregivers act as extensions of the child, providing vital support by holding, feeding, and cleaning up after the baby without complaint until the baby is fully ready to initiate that function. There is no pressure toward or even encouragement of independent functioning. Thus a sense of interpersonal boundaries between the baby and the caregiver is blurred during the first and second years of life.
4. There is an active discouragement of physical autonomy or separate functioning.
5. Young babies are gratified as much as possible because they are considered to be gods and treated as such. Another reason for providing gratification as the baby turns into a toddler, is in order to avert the development of assertion or willfulness, which would tend to increase a sense of separateness or I-awareness (*ahamkara*).

Breast-feeding of the child continues for sometimes four to seven years. When children start eating solid food, mothers feed them by putting the morsel of food directly into the child's mouth. This act is again seen by Goodman (1996:111) as de-emphasizing even “somatic self-other differentiation, blurring physical boundaries.” The bath provides another example that nothing can be accomplished alone. The baby is bathed while two persons help. Sleeping arrangements are also communal. Children most often sleep in the same bed as their parents. At least until the age of eight the children are never allowed to sleep alone. In the West learning to sleep alone is part of becoming an independent person and children are expected to sleep separately from their parents and alone from birth. Indians teach their children to walk while supporting them. Here again “the child perceives that learning to walk does not depend on individual effort, but is a cooperative effort which depends on the help of their parents. Thus the achievement of the child is underplayed while the interdependence of the child and the family group is reinforced” (Goodman 1996:11

## Conclusion

The relationality of self and freedom with society and community in India was first assailed under the colonial rule, and now the concept of economic development, by promoting competition and greed and the development of a consumerist society, is rapidly eroding this conception of self and freedom. This is not to suggest that there was no oppression in the family and society in India before colonialism. But resorting to development as freedom – type I will not end oppression. In modern Indian society, for example in child care, considerable authority is given to the pediatrician, whose “advice can supercede not only that of the priest, but also that of the grandmother when it comes to prescribing correct diet and care of the infant” (Goodman 1996:114). Who is to assess that the pediatrician’s knowledge is superior to that of the grandmother? If it is not, how does one guard against the danger of the modern system of medicine becoming oppressive? With women and men taking paid employment outside the house other questions arise: Would it be possible to continue the child care practices described by Goodman? If not, what is the way out?

In development – type II the pediatrician, grandmother, and priest would have to enter into a dialogue. The pediatrician, instead of being arrogant about his knowledge system would have to lend an ear to the “other system” and then prescribe judiciously. Pediatricians should not be done away with, but they should get acquainted with local practices. For example, several local practices for immunization are not only cost-effective, but also without any side effects. Similarly, the postnatal care of the mother and child and the baby’s food vary not only from region to region in India, depending on the climatic conditions and availability of resources, but also across caste and community, based on dietary habits.

However, the matter does not end here. There are two other questions to be raised about the child care practices in India described by Goodman (1996:114): (1) Is it possible to continue with these traditional practices of child care without oppressing women? (2) Will such an upbringing enable the children to compete in the global market later in life? The answer to both these questions is no *if* the corporate structure of production prevails. Thus culture is not the only culprit. Competitive individualism alone is suited to the corporate structure of production.. But competitive individualism and the attendant form of corporate production result in a care-

deficient society. The pursuit of inner freedom and a society that values care are not possible with a structure of production that produces on a large scale, with its urge for constantly increasing productivity guided mainly by the profit motive, irrespective of its adverse impact on the environment. Such a system of production makes human beings into robots. Development as freedom – type II and the corporate structure of production are incompatible. The focus of the development debate would have to shift from culture to the system of production. Is the system of production that has come to exist after the Industrial humane? Custom and tradition in Eastern society may be oppressive but a switch to the system of production emanating from the Industrial Revolution brings along with it newer forms of exercising power that sometimes reinforce the older ones, rather than eliminating them.

Therefore development as freedom – type II would have to work for a different system of production and consumption where wants and activities or consumption and production are connected organically, not artificially through advertisement and other marketing strategies. In this type of development the work done would not be so demeaning that the “self becomes empty” to be filled only by the compulsive urge to buy more and more, irrespective of need.

The people involved in the process of type II development must be made aware not only of the oppressive customs and tradition, but also of the newer forms of oppression involved in the culture of the market, the corporate form of production, and the civil society that comes with it. For example, Metha Bai should know that if she goes by the ethics of the market and her son is also brought up with that ethic, there is no guarantee that in her old age he will look after her. If she still has respect for some of the Eastern values, like simplicity, pursuit of inner freedom, nonacquisitiveness, and providing care for one’s kin and children as a matter of service, but wants to shun the evils of tradition and custom that oppress the weak on the basis of gender and caste, she would do well to work out a lifestyle in accordance with it. She would not be able to vote for the family as it exists today in India. Newer forms of family would have to emerge. But it is equally impossible to work for a change within the corporate system of production. This is evident from the movements in the U.S. toward downshifting, viz., voluntarily opting for a lower income and staying out of the job system. She would have to join forces with the movement in

the West for a simple living and work for inner happiness, as opposed to the pursuit of external pleasure.

However, it is not the poor Rajasthani widow who could be expected to take the lead. In type II development the strong would have to be prepared to forgo some of their rights in favor of the weak. The rich would have to forgo their rights for the sake of the poor, humans for animals, men for women, adults for children, literate for illiterate, urban for rural, developed countries for the less developed, and so on. Without such an ethical attitude among the better off in a society beset with inequality the mere existence of a civil society with individuals pursuing competitive individualism and freedom – type I would not mean liberation or progress for all its members. Otherwise, how is it that a well-developed civil society in the so-called developed countries is unable to make satisfactory arrangements for the care of children, the sick, and the old? In those developed countries (like the Scandinavian) where the state has provided a network of care the situation is somewhat better. But there also it is becoming increasingly unsustainable.

A care-rich society can be built only around a system of production in which work and life are not separated, where labor is not merely a painful exertion, but a joyful experience. Labor in such a society should be oriented toward the production of life, and not merely the production of things and wealth, as the goal of work. Such a concept of labor also has a different concept of time, in which time spent on burdensome labor and that spent on leisure are not separated, but rather times of work and of rest and enjoyment are to be alternated and interspersed. It stresses maintenance of work as a direct and sensual interaction with nature, organic matter, and living organisms. The most important characteristic of work should be its purposefulness and usefulness (Mies 1986; Schumacher 1997). Care and relation are built into such a system – care for the young, the old, the sick, and everything animate and inanimate. Love, not competition is the basis of such a society.

In such an attempt the developing countries are not alone. Frithjof Bergmann initiated the movement for new work in the United States. This movement attempts to minimize “job-work” and provide everyone the possibility of spending part of the time pursuing a “paid calling.” The members of this group are expected to train themselves in the gestation of ideas and the presumption is that they live in a society in which valuable ideas are encouraged and supported

in a colorful variety of ways; so any number of people might say that they will seek support for one of their “callings” and in exchange for that relinquish their claim to one of the currently endangered part-time jobs...[T]he indispensable condition for any Economic Freedom is the freedom to say No to a new technology, No to [a] new line of products, No to a yet more concocted line of “services,” No to Goliath-Corporations. Even when they dangle the promise of jobs. (Bergmann 2000:501-2)

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